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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) ("ap-
peals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction 
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony"). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This is a second appeal in a criminal tax evasion case. Following the Utah 
Supreme Court's reversal of their convictions, State v. Steed, 2014 UT 16, 325 P.3d 
87, defendants asked the trial court to order return of (1) the fines they had paid; 
(2) tax penalties and interest they were ordered to pay as criminal restitution; 
(3) costs of incarceration; and ( 4) supervision fees paid to Adult Probation and 
~ Parole. The trial court ordered return of the fines, but refused to order return of 
the balance of the monies the Steeds had been required to pay as a result of the 
now-overturned convictions. 
1. Where the tax penalties and interest had not been assessed by the 
State Tax Commission, and instead were paid solely because of the restitution 
order, did due process require their return because reversal of the convictions left 
no remaining legal basis for the restitution order? This issue was preserved by 
motion at R. 1202-061. Resolution of this issue turned on a legal, rather than fac-
1 Record references are to the Joan Steed record (081907873). Identical pleadings 
were filed in both cases below. 
tual, analysis, so de novo review is appropriate. See State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2. Does the same due process analysis require return of the incarcera-
tion costs and probation service costs, or may the State retain these monies as ~ 
fees for services even though they share the same flawed legal source? This issue 
was preserved in the same motion cited above, and is subject to the same stand-
ard of review. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE § 77-38a-301 provides, "'In a criminal action, the court may re-
quire a convicted defendant to make restitution." 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I, sec- ~ 
tion 7 of the Utah Constitution, provide in pertinent part, "No person ... shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A jury convicted defendants of three counts of failure to file income tax re-
turns, for the years 2003-2005; and acquitted them of all tax evasion counts, and 
of failure to file counts for the years 2006 and 2007. Based solely on the three 
convictions for failure to file, they were also convicted of a pattern of unlawful 
activity. 
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The court sentenced Frank Steed to a suspended prison term and 365 days 
in jail. It ordered him to pay restitution to the Utah State Tax Commission of 
$60,430.12, which included penalties of $24,858.40 and interest of $24,976,72. (F. 
;.;J Steed R. 1334-36.) 
The court sentenced Joan Steed to a suspended prison term and 180 days 
in jail. It ordered her to pay restitution to the Utah State Tax Commission of 
$397,123.50, which included penalties of $55,662.80 and interest of $51,681.23. 
(R. 959-61.) 
It is significant that these penalties and interest charges were not assessed 
by the Tax Commission following the available statutory and adnrinistrative pro-
cess; rather, they were imposed solely as part of the criminal restitution order. 
The time for imposition of penalties and interest by other lawful means has ex-
~ pired. See UTAH CODE§ 59-1-1410(1). 
They day before the criminal charges were filed, the State on October 14, 
2008 obtained an order from the court freezing $3,118,997.09 of the Steeds' funds. 
The seizure of those funds was the subject of a separate appeal recently decided 
by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76. The $302,777.15 in fines 
and restitution the court imposed as part of its sentencing orders were taken 
from those frozen funds pursuant to order entered May 10, 2011 and were fully 
satisfied from that source. (R. 1006-08.) Because the restitution order was imme-
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diately satisfied from the seized funds, no civil judgment of restitution was en-
tered pursuant to UTAH CODE§ 77-38a-401. 
Following denial of motions to stay and for certificates of probable cause 
by the district court (R. 1084-85) and this Court (August 23, 2011), the Steeds ~ 
served their terms of incarceration at the Wasatch County Jail. Pursuant to the 
pay-to-stay policy of the jail, Mr. Steed paid a total of $18,745 to serve his term at 
the Wasatch County Jail. Mrs. Steed paid a total of $11,110 in connection with 
her term of incarceration. (R. 1312-13.) 
Following their release, Mr. Steed paid Adult Probation and Parole 
$1,581.02, and Mrs. Steed paid $1,712, for probation supervision fees. (R. 1315-
16.) 
On May 16, 2014, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the convictions and 
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgments of ac- 1GJ 
quittal. State v. Steed, 2014 UT 16, ,r 56, 325 P.3d 87. Following remand, defend-
ants moved the trial court to order refund of "all fines, penalties and interest as-
sessed against them as part of the Court's crim.inal sentence and resulting order 
of restitution and all costs associated with their incarceration and probation." 
(R. 1202.) The Steeds did not move the trial court to order refund of the principal 
amount of taxes they owed and had paid as part of the restitution order, totaling 
$149,433.67. 
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The trial court granted the motion in part, ordering that the $145,598 fine 
~ the Steeds had paid should be refunded to them. (R. 1386.) The court denied the 
motion, however, as it related to the $157,179.15 restitution (penalties and inter-
...;) est), reasoning that the defendants' tax returns were filed late, and so the State 
Tax Commission would have had authority to assess the penalty that was the ba-
sis for the restitution order. (R. 1385-86.) The court also declined to return the 
$29,855 cost of incarceration in the Wasatch County Jail, deeming it to have been 
paid pursuant to a "civil contract entered into by Wasatch County and Defend-
ants." (R. 1386-87.) F:inally, the court declined to return the supervision fees of 
$3,293.02 "because such fees are not a deposit within the meaning of Utah Crimi-
nal Procedure and because Defendants actually received the State's supervision 
services." (R. 1387-88.)2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Due process requires more than just notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
It also requires that no person be deprived of liberty or property without a prop-
er legal basis for doing so. 
2 After the notice of appeal was filed, a question arose whether the trial court had 
actually entered the required final judgments of acquittal. On March 24, 2015, 
this Court entered an Order of Limited Remand directing the trial court to clarify 
whether a final order had been entered. In response, the trial court entered an 
order on April 23, 2015 that included the final judgments of acquittal as well as 
resolution of certain ancillary matters not material to this appeal. (R. 1421-24.) 
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Here, the legal basis for the trial court's restitution order was UTAH CODE 
§ 77-38a-301, which provides, "In a criminal action, the court may require a con-
victed defendant to make restitution." (Emphasis added.) When the Steeds' 
convictions were reversed, the trial court's authority to order restitution evapo- ~ 
rated-they were no longer ''convicted defendant[s]." 
The trial court sought to preserve its restitution order on the basis that it 
represented tax penalties and interest that the Tax Commission could have im-
posed anyway. This ignores the legal foundation of the order, which was restitu-
tion. The Tax Commission did not levy these penalties and mterest pursuant to 
its statutory authority, which would have provided the Steeds a forum in which 
to challenge them. By imposing the penalties and interest as restitution, the trial 
court bypassed that process, but in doing so it irrevocably tied the fate of those 
penalties and interest to the fate of the convictions. 
The same due process analysis informs the Steeds' other claims for return 
of funds. The trial court refused to return incarceration costs and probation fees 
on the basis that they had been "voluntary" and that the Steeds had received a 
benefit. Those justifications are artificial and circular. They ignore the coercive 
context in which the payments were made. The only benefit the Steeds received 
was the ability to avoid imprisonment by submitting to the trial court's lesser, 
but no less coercive, probation order. 
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It is this coercive context that triggers due process. Where the trial court's 
legal authority to coerce the defendants has been eliminated, the consequences of 
its coercive orders must be eliminated as well. This requires restoration of all 
'{)) funds taken from or paid by the Steeds as a result of the now-reversed convic-
tions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DUE PROCESS REQUIRED THE REFUND OF ALL FINES, 
FEES, PENAL TIES, AND INTEREST PAID. 
There was, and is, no dispute in this case that, with judgments of acquittal 
entered in their favor, due process required refund of the fines that the Steeds 
paid. The judgments of acquittal deprived the court of the jurisdiction necessary 
to support the imposition of those penalties. See State v. Piekkola, 90 S.D. 335,241 
N.W.2d 563,564 (1976) ("There is no question that a conviction under an uncon-
stitutional statute is a nullity. There being no legal conviction ... a punishment, 
including a fine prescribed by statute, could not lawfully have been imposed."), 
u, overruled on other grounds by Matter of Estate of Erdmann, 447 N.W.2d 356 (S.D. 
1989). 
Although this fundamental premise was not in dispute, exploration of the 
premise's due process underpinnings is warranted because due process informs 
analysis of all of the consequences of conviction, not just the penalty imposed in 
the form of a fine. The State violates due process when it takes an individual's 
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property without a legal basis for doing so. In the present case, the entry of the 
judgments of acquittal stripped the State of any legal claim to the property it has 
taken from the Steeds. All payments that were required incident to the convic-
tions suffer from the same jurisdictional flaw, and must be returned. 
The necessity to refund fines and penalties paid pursuant to an invalid or 
reversed conviction has long been recognized. In an early annotation, the right 
to refund was said to hinge on whether the payment was voluntary or involun-
tary. See Annotation, Right to recover back fine or penalty paid in criminal proceeding, 
26 A.L.R. 1523 (1923). Implicitly, linking the right to recovery to the involuntary 
nature of the penalty implicates due process, because the issue is made to tum on 
the coercive nature of the deprivation and the authority of the state to impose it. 
In United States v. Lewis, 342 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1972), aff d, 478 F.2d 835 
(5th Cir. 1973), the defendant was convicted of tax evasion under a statute-later ~ 
held to be unconstitutional under the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth 
Amendment-imposing a federal 10 percent excise tax on gambling wagers. Af-
ter the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the statute, the defendant sought return 
of the fine he had paid. The government argued that the payment of the fine had 
been 11voluntary" because the defendant had entered a guilty plea. The court 
disagreed: "This court is inclined to take the view that movants' guilty pleas 






under the duress of penalties provided by a statute since declared unconstitu-
tional." 342 F. Supp. at 835. Applying a due process analysis, the court held that 
return of the fines was required: 
The Fifth Amendment prohibition against the taking of one's prop-
erty without due process of law demands no less than the full resti-
tution of a fine that was levied pursuant to a conviction based on an 
unconstitutional law. Fairness and equity compel this result, and a 
citizen has the right to expect as much from his government, not-
withstanding the fact that the government and the court were pro-
ceeding in good faith at the time of prosecution. 
Id. at 836. 
On appeal in Lewis, the issue was whether the district court had jurisdic-
tion to consider the claim against the government. In affirming the district court, 
however, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the monetary consequences of the 
conviction had to be set right: 
We can see no reason why a person who has paid a fine pursuant to 
an unconstitutional statute should be required to resort to a multi-
plicity of actions in order to obtain reimbursement of money to 
which he is entitled. Since the district court was empowered to set 
aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the 
conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as 
fines. 
United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir. 1973). Accord, United States v. 
Summa, 362 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (D. Conn. 1972) (following Lewis); Ex parte 
Mccurley, 412 So.2d 1236, 1238 (Ala. 1982) (same). 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of South Dakota in State v. Piekkola, 90 S.D. 
335, 241 N.W.2d 563 (1976), pronounced: 
Even as the court had the right to set aside Defendant's conviction it 
had the right and the duty to set aside the resulting sentence, includ-
ing the fine and court costs imposed. Once the conviction had been 
set aside the state was without a right to collect or retain the fine and 
costs and Defendant had a lawful expectation of their return. The 
refund was incident to the vacation of the judgment in question. 
241 N.W.2d at 564. Accord, People v. Meyerowitz, 61 lli.2d 200, 335 N.E.2d 1, 8 
(1975) ("We are of the opinion that the money, having been received in payment 
of fines imposed as an incident to judgments of conviction, should be ordered re- ~ 
funded as an incident to the vacation of the judgments under which it was or-
dered paid."); Bayer v. Payne, 411 N.W.2d 129, 132 (S.D. 1987) (Henderson, J., dis-
senting) ("Failing to return a fine and costs collected from any individual pursu-
ant to an unconstitutional conviction, is a violation of the Fifth Amendment."); 
cf, State v. Superior Court, 40 P.3d 1239, 1241 (Alaska 2002) (forfeiture of bail 
money "denied [the claimant] due process when the court issued an order that 
exceeded its statutory powers."). 
In the present case, there can be no question that all of the defendants' 
payments were involuntary within the meaning of the above line of cases. De- ciJ 
fendants were sentenced to indeterminate prison terms of not to exceed five 
years. Those sentences were suspended on the condition that they complete the 
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jail time the court ordered, pay the fines, pay the restitution, and comply with 
supervised probation for a period of six years. (R. 959-61.) 
The jurisdictional basis for all of those orders disappeared when the judg-
~ ments of acquittal were entered. At that point, all coercive consequences of the 
acquittals were nullified. As to the fines, the trial court recognized that the tak-
ing of defendants' property could no longer be justified. As to the other coercive 
consequences of the convictions, however, the trial court believed that they sur-
vived the due process challenge. As will be discussed in the next section, that 
conclusion was erroneous. The court's jurisdiction to impose coercive conse-
quences derived from the convictions and expired with them. The trial court's 
effort to distinguish those consequences ignored the due process underpinnings 
of the analysis and was therefore erroneous. 
II. THE RESTITUTION PAID BY THE STEEDS MUST BE RE-
FUNDED. 
As part of the judgment of conviction the trial court ordered the Steeds to 
viJ pay restitution, interest on the restitution and penalties associated with the resti-
tution, totaling $457,553.62. That amount comprised $149,433.67 in tax, and 
~ $308.119.95 in penalties and interest. The money was taken from the approxi-
mately $3.1 million of the Steeds' funds the State had seized at the commence-
ment of the case. The amount of tax was ascertained in a collaborative process 
between the Steeds' accountants and the State Tax Commission, and the Steeds 
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did not seek a refund of that portion of the restitution. The Steeds did, however, 
request that the penalties and interest that were ordered to be paid as restitution, 
$308,119.95, be refunded. 
The trial court declined to return the penalties and interest on the basis ~ 
that, at the time of the restitution order, the Tax Commission would have had the 
statutory authority to assess penalties and interest: 
Given Defendants' concession that they had sufficient income 
to ·trigger the filing requirement, the Utah State Tax Commission's 
statutory authority to charge penalties and interest, the fact that De-
fendant's tax returns for the 2003-2008 tax years were actually over-
due, and the fact that Defendants worked with the Utah State Tax 
Commission to agree upon taxes due along with penalties and inter-
est, the Court will not order that the penalties and interest paid to 
the Utah State Tax Commission be returned to Defendants. The 
Court is confident in this outcome, particularly because the penalties 
and interest charged here do not hinge on a criminal conviction; the 
penalties and interest charged here could have been charged to any 
person who failed to file and pay their taxes on time. As such, this 
portion of Defendants' Motion is denied. (R. 1386.) 
The trial court was placing its reliance on UTAH CODE§ 59-1-401, which al-
lows the Utah State Tax Commission to charge interest and other penalties for 
the underpayment of a tax. But the trial court is not the Tax Commission. The 
problem with the coll!t' s reasoning is that, while the Tax Commission may have 
had the statutory authority to assess penalties and interest, it did not exercise 
that authority. If it had done so, a statutory remedy would have been available 
for the Steeds to challenge those levies. By including penalties and interest in the 
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restitution order, the trial court was able to bypass that statutory process and de-
prive the Steeds of the remedies afforded by that process. The quid pro quo of that 
decision, however, was that the imposition of penalties rested on the restitution 
foundation, not the statutory assessment foundation. Thus, when the court's ju-
risdiction to impose restitution disappeared, so did the foundation for the as-
sessment. 
Due process therefore requires return of the penalties and interest. The 
trial court essentially attempted to enforce tax laws using its jurisdiction over a 
criminal case where an acquittal has been entered against the defendants. With-
out a conviction, the trial court lacked legal authority to impose restitution. See 
UTAH CODE§ 77-38a-301 ("In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted 
defendant to make restitution." (emphasis added)). Its attempt to impose restitu-
viJ ti.on against persons who were not II convicted defendants" exceeded the court's 
authority and violated the defendants' due process rights. No authority allows a 
court to order restitution from a defendant who has been acquitted of all charges. 
III. THE STEEDS ARE ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF ALL 
FEES AND COSTS PAID FOR PROBATION AND INCAR-
CERATION. 
A. Incarceration in Wasatch County. 
The Steeds paid $29,855 pursuant to the pay-to-stay policy of the Wasatch 
~ County Jail, in order to serve their jail time near their businesses. With work re-
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lease privileges, this facilitated limited maintenance of their business interests 
during the time they were deprived of their liberty by the trial court's orders. 
The trial court refused to return those funds based on the following ra-
tionale: 
When the Court sentenced Defendants, it ordered a period of incar-
ceration at the Salt Lake County Jail. Rather than serve their time in 
Salt Lake County Jail, Defendants chose to enter into a private con-
tract.with Wasatch County. While the Defendants were required to 
serve a period of incarceration, they voluntarily assumed the costs 
associated with serving that time in Wasatch County Jail. The Court 
concludes that the money paid to Wasatch County was the result of 
a civil contract entered into by Wasatch County and Defendants and 
was not paid as a fine or restitution in the underlying criminal action 
and will not order a refund. (R. 1386-87.) 
The trial court's reasoning is similar to the arguments rejected by the court 
in Lewis, in which the government argued that the defendant's guilty plea ren-
dered everything that happened thereafter voluntary and consensual. 
The Steeds served time at the Wasatch County Jail because the trial court 
ordered them to serve a period of incarceration. The Steeds did not want to be 
incarcerated. The Steeds did not want to be apart from each other, family and 
friends. Th.is was not a voluntary stay as it would have been if they checked into 
the Grand America Hotel. Their agreement to pay the costs of incarceration was ~ 
extracted pursuant to the coercive power of the convictions, just like the fines 
and restitution were extracted from them. The due process underpinnings of de-
fendants' arguments are exactly the same, and the jurisdictional vacuum created 
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by the reversal of those convictions is the same as well. Without the convictions, 
no legal basis existed for the court to deprive them of their liberty or their prop-
erty, and the trial court's efforts to cling to the vestiges of the convictions to justi-
~ fy retaining the incarceration costs violates due process. 
B. Supervision Fees. 
The Steeds paid $3,293.02 in probation supervision fees to the State. Even 
thought this was the smallest amount at issue, the trial court spent the most time 
analyzing it. The court applied the decision in State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994), which held that fees for rehabilitative services need not be re-
turned when a conviction is vacated. (R. 1387-88.) 
In Parker, the defendant was convicted of three counts of burglary and sen-
tenced to one to fifteen years in prison. 872 P.2d at 1042. The prison sentence 
~ was stayed and the defendant placed on probation, on condition that he pay a fi-
ne and attend the Fremont Center where he paid a monthly fee to participate in a 
rehabilitation program. Id. at 1043. The Fremont Center is a state-run halfway 
house that offers individuals on probation a place to live and treatment pro-
grams. 
The conviction was reversed on appeal because the evidence used to con-
vict was obtained in an unconstitutional arrest. The defendant sought return of 
the fine and Fremont Center fees. The trial court ordered refund of the fine, but 
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not the fees. On appeal, the court of appeals unanimously held that the court 
had jurisdiction over the claim, but fractured three ways on the return of the fees. 
Judge Billings would have returned the fees on due process grounds, holding 
that the requirement to pay those fees had been an incident of conviction, and ~ 
that the stay in the halfway house had a punitive as well as a rehabilitative com-
ponent. Id. at 1047. She reasoned that the requirement to pay the fee was no dif-
ferent than the fine-the defendant was required to pay it as a part of his proba-
tion, and although he could have chosen to go to prison, that did not make the 
choice voluntary. Id. 
Judge Davis approached the case from the standpoint of UTAH R. CRIM. P. 
28(a), which provides: "If a judgment of conviction is reversed ... any deposit of 
funds or property [must be] refunded to the proper person." He concluded that 
the rule "does not provide for the return of fees for rehabilitative services." Id. ~ 
He rejected Judge Billings' due process analysis, concluding that the fees were 
rehabilitative rather than· punitive, and that the defendant had received a benefit. 
He felt that due process had been satisfied because the defendant had been "giv-
en notice and a hearing before being deprived of his property rights." Id. at 1050. 
Judge Greenwood agreed with Judge Davis that a benefit had been con-
ferred. She disagreed with his due process analysis. She rejected his "notice and 
a hearing" due process analysis and agreed with Judge Billings' approach, but 
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concluded that due process 11fairness" did not mandate return of the fees because 
"defendant received something in exchange for his payment." Id. at 1050-51. 
It is not easy to generalize any conclusions from those opinions. It would 
appear that two judges agreed that due process is implicated and that it is more 
than a procedural requirement, but there was no agreement as to how it should 
be applied. Two judges agreed that "benefit" should be considered, although for 
different reasons, with only one seeing benefit as part of the due process analysis. 
The Parker case does seem to stand for the proposition that due process 
does not permit the State to retain money coercively obtained from a defendant, 
even in the context of probation, with the limited exception of money obtained in 
exchange for a benefit. Applying such an analysis in the case at bar would re-
quire return of the penalties paid in the form of restitution, because no benefit 
Vi/9 was received. 
Even as to the other categories of payments at issue in this case, it would 
seem that Parker supports refund. Unlike the treatment the defendant in Parker 
received, the Steeds received no treatment. Nothing about what happened to 
them can be characterized as a "benefit" in the sense of the judges in the case. 
Judge Davis relied in part on the proposition that "[t]he purposes of probation 
are 'reform and rehabilitation' rather than punishment." Id. at 1049. The Steeds' 
probation, however, was clearly punitive: they were required to serve periods of 
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incarceration which were not therapeutic. While the Steeds paid to serve their 
time in Wasatch County rather than Salt Lake County, the whole scenario un-
folded in the same coercive context as the other penalties. This is no different 
from the conclusions of Judges Billings and Greenwood in Parker that payment ~ 
was incident to the conviction. 
The costs of supervision were also neither voluntary nor therapeutic. The 
defendants received no benefit other than an ability to partially mitigate the ef-
fects of the court's sentence, just like the defendant in Parker who also complied 
with the terms of probation in order to avoid a more severe punishment. 
After reviewing the Lewis case and the other cases bearing upon the issue, 
Judge Billings described the applicable standard in a way that the Steeds believe 
should be adopted by the full court: 
Not only does the Fifth Amendment require notice and a hearing, 
but it requires that the state not deprive citizens of their property-
here fees paid incident to a conviction - without a valid legal basis. 
In the present case, the legal basis for the payment of the fees is no 
longer tenable: defendant's conviction has been vacated. Thus, the 
State violates due process when it takes defendant's property once 
its legal basis for doing so is gone. 
Id. at 1048. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants request that this Court reverse the 
trial court's judgment insofar as it refused to refund the restitution, incarceration 
-18-
costs, and supervision fees that were imposed as a consequence of the convic-
tions. 
DATED this ~y of September, 2015. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By~ 
Rodney R. ~arker 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-·-·--- ·-····- ..... -·········· __ ,,, ......... -................ , .. _.,_,,, ..... ·····----•--........ ---··-·····-. 
Plainti~ 
vs. 
FRANK J. STEED, 
JOAN A. STEED, 
Defendants. 
Judge Robin Rees 
Before the Court is Defendants Frank J. Steed ("Mr. Steed'1 and Joan 
---------,Steecl!s-(~sr-Steed~.colle~ti:v.el~'D.efendan~-Motion..to_Omer_as_~art_of~-o=-=en,,,.,.__ ______ _ 
of Acquittal the Refund of Fines, Penalties, Interest, and Costs Associated wi 
Incarceration and Probation ("Motion"). The Court has reviewed the moving, opposition, 
and reply papers. No hearing was requested. Having considered the briefing, e Court 
now roles as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
On September 17, 2010, Defendants were convicted of three counts o Failure to 
Render a Proper Tax Return and one count of Pattern of Unlawful Behavior. he Court 
sentenced Defendants on April 22, 2011. Mr. Steed's sentence required him · serve a 
365-day jail sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail. Ms. Steed's sentence requ ed her to 
serve 180 days in jail. In addition to jail time, the Court ordered that Mr. Ste pay 
restitution which included $24,858.40 in penalties and $24,976.72 in interest and ordered 
that Ms. Steed pay restitution which included $55,662.80 in penalties and $5 ,681.23 in 
interest The total amount of penalties and interest that the Steeds were order d to pay 
was $157,179.15. The Court also ordered Mr. Steed to pay of fine of $5,300 d ordered 
Ms. Steed to pay a fine of $140,298. The total amount of penalties, interest, 
the Steeds were ordered to pay was $302,777.15. 
Following the sentencing hearing and after the commencement of his j il time, 
Mr. Steed filed a motion requesting that he be allowed to serve the remainder f his 
sentence in Wasatch County Jail. The Court granted Mr. Steed's motion and o derecl, on 
...................................... )ui~l8·~·20U~ 'thafMl· ··stee~IialL ............ ····-a·b ............. ··such conditionn~on 
contract of confinement by and between he and Wasatch County, including 
costs, work release conditions and any all such costs and conditions of confine ent and 
release imposed by Wasatch County." On October 25, 2011, Ms. Ste~d filed a imilar 
motion requesting that she be able to seive her jail sentence in Wasatch Coun . The 
Court also granted that motion pursuant to the tenns of the contract of confine 
between Ms. Steed and Wasatch County. In total, for their jail time served, the 
paid Wasatch County Jail $29,855. Additionally, while on probation, Mr. Stee paid 
$1,581.02 and Ms. Steed paid $1,712 for their supervision fees for a total of$3 93.02. 
The total paid by Defendants in restitution, fines, and fees amounts to 
-------'$33-S,9~d-=7-.-Gn-May-16,201-4,the-lJtah-Supr.eme-Court:..issued..an...order.i:eqlliipn:gg_. t11thiw0 sL__ ______ _ 
Court to enter an acquittal for Defendants. 
DISCUSSION ~ 
Given the Utah Supreme Court's order, Defendants' Motion requests th 
Court order, as part of the Judgment of Acquittal, that the Utah State Tax Co 
the Utah State Deparbnent of Corrections, the Wasatch County Sheriff's Offic 
Adult Probation & Parole refund to Defendants all penalties, interest, fines, an 
fees assessed against them as part of their criminal sentence, order of restitutio , 
incarceration, and probation plus interest at the legal rate. 
A. Utah State Tax Commission 
Defendants paid, as part of the order of restitution, $157,179.15 in pen 
interest to the Utah State Tax Commission. Defendants contend that this amo 
be returned to them because the penalties and interest were ordered as part of th now 
vacated judgment of conviction. The State argues that Defendants are not entitl d to 
a refund of this amount because there is no question that Defendants failed to e tax 
returns for the years of 2003-2008 (in fact, Defendants conceded "that they had cient 
. . 
income [each year] to trigger the filing requirement," Sta.te v. Steed, 2014 UT 1 ., 112325 





and interest to any person who fails to file and pay their taxes. 
Given Defendants' concession that they bad sufficient income to trigg 
requirement, the Utah State Tax Commission's statutory authority to charge p 
-
____ · .. ·_· .. _ .... _ .. ...1· ..n1 .... ·~·-·-~-·•m .. ;,J··thtg·~cfnfaciQ-·tuttbh~atU·D~e~'fe~n~d~an~t~·ts~· tax~· ·g .. r~etums~~-1foQ!rjth~e~·2~0~0~3-~·2:Q:00~8~ .. tax~·1e~ars~·w~ere~· ~~!¥~ .. -~. -~-~-~--~-· ~-. -~- ~-~~ 
overdue, and the fact that Defendants worked with the Utah State Tax Commis ion to 
agree upon taxes due along with penalties and interest, the Court will not order the 
penalties and interest paid to the Utah State Tax Commission be returned to D endants. 
The Court is confident in this outcome, particularly because the penalties and · terest 
charged here do not hinge on a criminal conviction; the penalties and interest c 
here could have been charged to any person who failed to file and pay their tax 
As such, this portion of Defendants' Motion is denied. 
B. Utah State Department of Corrections 
At sentencing, Defendants were fined in the amount of $145,598. That 
------was-taken-frem-the-Stceds!-fr.ozen-accounts.hy_the..S.tate..and..paid to the Dq2==;==:.=,___ _______ _ 
of Corrections. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 28(a) explains that "if a ju 
conviction is reversed ... any deposit of funds or property [must be] refunded t 
proper person." The Utah Court of Appeals has held that reimbursement is r 
fines and smcharges which arose as incidents of conviction. State v. Parker., 87 
1041, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1994}. Given Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 28(a and the 
determination made by the Utah Court of Appeals., the Court concludes that the es paid 
by defendants must be returned. As such, as part of the Judgment of Acquittal., tab State 
Department of Corrections is hereby ordered to refund $145,598 plus interest at 
rate to Defendants. 
C. Wasatch County Sheriff's Office 
Defendants request that the Court issue aii order requiring the Wasatch 
Sheriff's Office to refund the money it was paid by Defendants during their resp ctive 
terms of incarceration. The Court respectfully denies Defendants' request. Whe the 
Court sentenced Defendants, it ordered a period of incarceration at the Salt Lake County 
Jail. Rather than serve their time in Salt Lake County Jail, Defendants chose to 
a private contract with Wasatch County. While the Defendants were•required to 
a period of incarceration, they voluntarily assumed the costs associated with s 
3 
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that time in Wasatch County Jail. The Court concludes that the m~ney paid to asatch 
County was the result of a civil contract entered into by Wasatch County and 
and was not paid as a fine or restitution in the underlying criminal action and 
...... ··-· ........... . 
-----···_···_···_l--ow·i.U,l·a~mn: .. ··············· .. · ..·-·--·--······ .... · · ·····----------·--·-- .. --- .......................... · ................................................ ··· · · ........................ · 
D. Adult Probation and Parole 
Lastly, Defendants seek a refund of the fees they paid to Adult Probatio 
Parole. In State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct App. 1994), the Utah Court 
Appeals examined the requirements of Rule 28 of the Utah Rules of Criminal P ocedure. 
Rule 28 provides: 
If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless o erwise 
specified by the appellate court. Pending a new trial or other proceeding, the 
defendant shall be detained, or released upon bail, or otherwise restricte as the 
trial court on remand determines proper. If no further trial or proceeding to be 
had a defendant in custody shall be discharged, and a defendant restricte by bail 
· shall be released from restriction and bail exonerated and deposit 
of funds or property refunded to the proper person. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a). The Court of Appeals, seeking to provide an interpretati n 
of"any deposit of funds or property [to be] refunded to the proper person," loo~ 
Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of"deposit." Id. at 1049. Black's de 
deposit as: 
A bailment of goods to be kept by the bailee without reward, and deliv~ 
according to the object or purpose of the original trust. In general, an act y which 
a person receives the property of another, binding himself to preserve it d return 
it in kind The delivery of chattels by one person to another to keep for th use of 
the bailor .... 
· Money placed with a person as an e~est or security for the performance 
contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his [ or her] undertaking. 
Given this definition, the Court of Appeals concluded that, although Rule 28 pro 
for the return. of bail and deposits when a conviction is vacated, it does not provid for 
the return of fees for rehabilitative services. Id. In State v. Walker, the Idaho Co of 
Appeals examined the Utah Court of Appeals' conclusions in State v. Parker. Th e, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that "requiring the payment of fees to defray co of 
supervision on probation, if possible to perform, is reasonable and has a rehabilita: ·ve 
4 
· .. ! 
effect'' and held that, even though a defendant's conviction was set aside, the d fendant 
was not entitled to a refund of supervision fees. State v. Walker, 887 P.2d 53, 5 
App. 1994) . 
. . ···-·· .............. Gh~n~~clusfonsby.botb tbeUtabT'ii1iff0fk·····----·· -··ana·thtfldano· 
of Appeals, this Court concludes that it would be inappropriate to refund the fl s paid 
by Defendants to Adult Probation and Parole because such fees are not a depos within 
the meaning of Utah Criminal Procedure and because Defendants actually recei ed the 
State's supervision services. 
ORDER 
Based on the forgoing, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY O BRED 
that Defendants'· Motion is GRATED in part and DENIED in part consistent wi 
Ruling above. 
This Ruling and Order is the final order of the court, and no additional o der is 
equired-to-be-prepared-in-this-~r..-------------+--------
DATED this _2_ day of October, 2014. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
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